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THE MEANING OF "FACTS OR DATA" IN FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 703: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION TO RELY ON
FEDERAL RULE 702 IN DAUBERT v.
MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED*
"Two roads diverged in a wood,
and I-
I took the one less travelled by,
And that has made all the difference."
-ROBERT FROST, THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
INTRODUCTION
In its decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 the
United States Supreme Court joined in the controversy over the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence. The controversy is a product of two
phenomena. On the one hand, scientific evidence has increasingly
become the method of choice for resolving factual questions posed by
legal disputes. If the question is whether O.J. Simpson participated in
the killing of his former wife Nicole Simpson and her friend Ronald
Goldman, we turn to molecular biologists and DNA typing.2 When
the issue is whether Lyle Menendez possessed the mens rea for mur-
der when he shot his father and mother, we listen to testimony by
mental health professionals.3 In an automobile collision case, acci-
dent reconstruction experts are called on to apply the laws of physics.4
When an employer has allegedly discriminated in hiring on the basis
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; former Chair, Evidence Section,
American Association of Law Schools. Professor Imwinkelried consulted with the plain-
tiffs' attorneys in preparing the briefs before the United States Supreme Court in the
Daubert case.
1. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
2. See Bill Kisliuk, Admissibility Rift Clouds DNA Use in Simpson Case, THE RECORDER,
June 24, 1994, at 1.
3. See Menendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786 (Cal. 1992) (discussing scientific
expert testimony on the defendant's state of mind while committing the crime at issue).
4. See RUDOLF LIMPERT, MOTOR VEHICLE AcCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION AND CAUSE ANALY-
Sis (3d ed. 1989).
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of race or sex, a court is likely to hear testimony about regression anal-
ysis from statisticians.5
On the other hand, however, mounting evidence suggests that
scientific testimony is often flawed. Peter Huber of the Manhattan
Institute has bluntly charged that much of the expert testimony admit-
ted by American courts is "junk science," based on spurious, unsub-
stantiated theories.6 That charge is buttressed by shocking instances
in which experts have either overstated their credentials7 or fabricated
test results.8 Moreover, numerous proficiency studies document a
substantial margin of error in scientific analysis.9
In the Daubert case, the Supreme Court confronted this contro-
versy in microcosm. The plaintiffs included Jason Daubert and his
parents, William and Joyce Daubert.' ° Jason was born with serious
limb defects, and the plaintiffs alleged that these defects were caused
by his mother's use of an anti-nausea drug, Bendectin, manufactured
by the defendant. 1 The plaintiffs relied in part on testimony by epi-
demiologists-experts in the use of statistical techniques-to demon-
strate correlations between exposure to certain substances and
increased risks of illness.' 2
In simplified form, the testimony was syllogistic in structure.' 3 To
construct their major premise, the plaintiffs' experts relied on general
assumptions about the validity of mathematics, statistics, and epidemi-
5. See Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 CoLuM. L. REv. 702
(1980).
6. PETER W. HuBR, GAtiLEo's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
7. See Carol Henderson Garcia, Expert Witness Malpractice: A Solution to the Problem of the
Negligent Expert Witness, 12 Miss. C. L. REV. 39 (1991).
8. See Lawrence I. Shulruff, Lab Evidence Questioned, 80 A.B.A.J. 16 (July 1994); Corrupt
Forensic Scientist Contaminates Hundreds of Convictions in West Viiginia and Texas, 18 THE
CHeAMPION 56 (June 1994).
9. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The
Reliability of Scientific Proof 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1988) (collecting and analyzing such stud-
ies); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The
Lessons of Handwriting Identification Expertise, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 731, 738-61 (1989) (review-
ing studies on the proficiency of questioned document examiners).
10. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
11. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2791 (1993).
12. Id. In addition to relying on epidemiological evidence, the plaintiffs presented tes-
timony regarding "in vitro" (test tube) and "in vivo" (live) animal studies as well as pharma-
cological analyses comparing the chemical structure of Bendectin with that of other
substances known to cause birth defects. Id. at 2791-92.
13. See generally EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, The Educational Significance of the Syllogistic Struc-
ture of Expert Testimony, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1148 (1993) (explaining the use of syllogisms in
scientific expert testimony); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The
Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1988) (same) [hereinafter "Ba-
ses" of Expert Testimony]. The Daubert Court cites the latter article in footnote 4 of the major-
ity opinion. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793 n.4.
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ology.' 4 The experts conceded that the published epidemiological
studies of Bendectin did not show a statistically significant correlation
between its use and congenital limb defects.' 5 They contended, how-
ever, that pooling data in previous studies and reanalyzing it is a scien-
tifically valid technique. a6 The experts asserted that the re-analysis
yielded a statistically significant, and therefore potentially causal, rela-
tionship between the use of Bendectin and the type of limb defects
Jason suffered. 7
The plaintiffs' experts then applied this causation theory to the
minor premise including reports that Joyce Daubert had ingested
Bendectin during her first trimester and thatJason was born with cer-
tain limb deformities.1 The application of the major premise to the
minor premise led to the conclusion that the defendant's product had
caused Jason's limb defects.1 9 The defense attacked this conclusion
by questioning both the validity of the epidemiological re-analysis
technique and the hypothesis that the maternal use of Bendectin can
cause limb deformities.20
Although the plaintiffs initially filed their suit in California state
court, the defendant had the suit removed to federal court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship.2 In federal court, Merrell Dow filed a
pretrial summary judgment motion.2 2 The motion was supported by
an affidavit executed by a Dr. Lamm. In his affidavit, Dr. Lamm as-
serted that he had canvassed all the published epidemiological studies
of Bendectin.2' According to the affidavit, none of the studies re-
vealed a statistically significant relationship between the incidence of
birth defects and Bendectin use.24 In its motion for summary judg-
ment, Merrell Dow cited Dr. Lamm's affidavit as proof that the hy-
pothesis that Bendectin causes limb deformities is not generally
accepted in scientific circles.25 The plaintiffs opposed the motion.
14. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Standard for Validating Scientific Evidence:
Linking Us to the Scientific Past, 1 SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EvD. Q. 493, 497 (1994).
15. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
16. Id. at 2792.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2791.
22. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal.
1989).
23. Id. at 575.
24. Id.
25. Id.
[VOL. 54:352
1995] FACTS OR DATA IN FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703 355
Their counter-affidavits described the epidemiological re-analysis con-
ducted by their experts.26
The district court granted Merrell Dow's motion for summary
judgment. 7 In so doing, the district judge relied heavily on Federal
Rule of Evidence 703. That Rule states:
RULE 703. BASES OF OPINIONS BY EXPERTS
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived
by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.28
The trial judge highlighted the statutory language, "of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field."29 According to the
district judge, that language codified the standard announced in 1923
in Frye v. United States.3 ° This standard requires that a foundation for
scientific evidence include proof that "the principle upon which it is
based [be] sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the field to which it belongs."" l The district judge interpreted prior
federal decisions as announcing that a finding of "causation in this
area" cannot be considered "generally accepted" unless it rests on epi-
demiological research finding a statistically significant nexus.32 The
judge granted the motion for summary judgment because none of the
published studies found the requisite nexus.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit. Though the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district
court, its conclusion rested on a different rationale.3 3 The court did
not cite any provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence as authority.
Rather, the court explicitly relied on the common law "general accept-
ance" standard announced in Frye.34 Though the court acknowledged
that the epidemiological re-analysis lent some support to the plain-
tiffs' position, it noted that the re-analysis had not been published in a
26. Id. at 571.
27. Id. at 570.
28. FED. R. EVID. 703.
29. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 572.
30. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For a thorough discussion of the Frye standard, see
Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197 (1980).
31. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
32. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
34. Id. at 1129-30.
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peer-reviewed, scientific journal.3 5 The court asserted that re-analyses
are accepted "only when" they are "subjected to... scrutiny by others
in the field."3 6 Therefore, the re-analysis did not pass muster under
Frye and it could not be deemed "generally accepted."37
After losing in both the district court and the court of appeals,
the plaintiffs sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. The
Court granted the writ 8 and reversed. 9 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Blackmun held that the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence in 1975 had undercut Fye.4° He also concluded that the Ninth
Circuit had erred in turning to the common law rather than searching
for a controlling standard in the text of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.41
One of the key provisions of the Federal Rules is Rule 402. That
rule states that all logically relevant evidence is admissible "except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of
Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority."42 The Rule makes no mention
of case or decisional law. The Rule implies that federal courts may no
longer invoke uncodified exclusionary rules of evidence to bar the
introduction of logically relevant evidence. Justice Blackmun approv-
ingly quoted a passage from an article written by the late Professor
Edward Cleary, the Reporter for the Federal Rules: "In principle,
under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains."43 The
majority could not find language in any of the Federal Rules suscepti-
ble to the interpretation that the drafters had codified the "general
acceptance" test.4" Frye was dead, seemingly clearing the way for
courts to employ even novel scientific techniques as the method of
choice for resolving factual disputes.
The Daubert majority acknowledged, however, the mounting evi-
dence that much scientific testimony is inaccurate. Justice Blackmun
emphasized that overruling Frye did not mean that federal courts will
admit purportedly scientific testimony willy nilly.45 Quite to the con-
35. Id. at 1130.
36. Id. at 1131.
37. Id.
38. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
39. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
40. Id. at 2793-95.
41. Id. at 2794.
42. FED. R EVID. 402.
43. Daubert, 113 S. CL at 2794 (citing Edward Cleary, Preiminary Notes on Reading the
Ruies of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. Rav. 908 (1978)).
44. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
45. Id. at 2794-95.
356 [VOL. 54:352
1995] FACTS OR DATA IN FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 703 357
trary, he underscored that under the Federal Rules, trial judges have a
vital gatekeeping function to perform.' However, unlike the trial
judge in Daubert, the majority did not rely on Federal Rule of Evidence
703 to define that function. Instead, the majority deduced restrictions
on the admission of scientific evidence from Rule 702. 4 7 That Rule
reads:
RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tes-
tify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.4
Justice Blackmun focused on the expression, "scientific... knowl-
edge." He explained that science is a process rather than a static body
of propositions.49 He added that, "in order to qualify as 'scientific
knowledge' [within the intendment of Rule 702], an inference or as-
sertion must be derived by the scientific method."5" According to the
majority, the scientific method is a validation technique, consisting in
the formulation of hypotheses, followed by observation or experimen-
tation to test the hypotheses.5" Whenever a litigant claims that a par-
ticular scientific theory or technique is valid, that claim is a hypothesis
requiring empirical verification. It is incumbent upon the trial judge
to determine whether expert testimony satisfies the validation stan-
dard. The majority then instructed trial judges to consider the follow-
ing factors, inter alia, in making that determination: whether the
hypothesis has been tested, whether the technique has been subjected
to peer review and publication, whether the technique has an ascer-
tainable error rate, and whether the methodology used to generate
the conclusion is generally accepted.5 2 In concluding, Justice Black-
mun added the caveat that "[tihe focus ... must be solely on [under-
lying] principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
generate. "5 Hence, so long as the conclusion rests on sound scien-
tific methodology, the conclusion is admissible under Rule 702 even if
the conclusion is novel and controversial.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. FED. R. EVID. 702.
49. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see ERNEsT E. SNYDER, HIsTORY OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES ch. 4 (1969) (discuss-
ing traditional methods of validating scientific hypotheses).
52. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
53. Id. at 2797.
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Although the Daubert decision is just over a year old, the decision
has already generated a massive body of commentary.5 4 The principal
theme of the commentary has been the difference between the Frye
"general acceptance" test and the scientific validation standard an-
nounced in Daubert. However, the commentary has largely over-
looked a more fundamental issue: To which parts of the scientist's
reasoning process does the Daubert standard apply?
Examining the Daubert case itself, two things seem clear. First, the
trial judge should apply the Daubert test to determine whether an
opinion generated by epidemiological re-analysis can ever qualify as
"scientific knowledge" under Rule 702. As previously stated, in
Daubert, the plaintiffs' epidemiological experts conducted a re-analysis
of the published studies.55 The experts assumed that epidemiological
re-analysis of pooled data is a valid technique, applied that technique
to a certain quantum of previously reported research, and thereby dis-
covered a statistically significant correlation.5" It is clear that in order
to justify the admission of their evidence, the plaintiffs must prove
that epidemiological re-analysis is a valid scientific technique under
Rule 702.57 Justice Blackmun's caveat cautions trial judges to focus on
underlying "principles and methodology" in applying the new Daubert
standard.58 Whatever else the reference to "methodology" encom-
passes, it must mean that the plaintiffs are obliged to demonstrate the
general validity of unpublished epidemiological re-analyses.
Conversely, the Daubert standard does not apply to the later stages
in the expert's chain of reasoning, namely the case-specific assump-
tions thatJoyce Daubert had ingested Bendectin and that her son was
born with limb deformities. That type of information certainly consti-
tutes "facts or data in the particular case" under Rule 703.
The unsettled question is which other parts of the expert's rea-
soning process are governed by the Daubert validation standard. In
particular, does the standard extend to such questions as whether the
studies pooled were sufficiently comparable to permit a meta-analysis,
whether the size of the underlying database was large enough; and
whether the experts correctly applied statistical significance tech-
niques to evaluate the research data? Should the trial judge address
54. The Cardozo Law Review has published a symposium issue devoted to Daubert. See
Symposium, Scientific Evidence After the Death of Frye, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 1745 (1994). En-
tire issues of Shepard's Expert and Scientific Evidence Quarterly have consisted of Daubert arti-
cles; the Winter 1994 issue, Vol. 1, No. 3, is illustrative.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
56. Id,
57. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795; see supra text accompanying note 47.
58. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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those questions as part of the determination whether the plaintiff's
proffered testimony qualifies as "scientific knowledge" under Rule
702, or are those questions part of the decision whether the expert
has "reasonably relied" on proper "facts or data" under Rule 703? In
the final analysis, the answer turns on the proper interpretation of
"facts or data." Are "[t]he facts or data in the particular case" limited
to case-specific information such as Mrs. Daubert's use of Bendectin,
or more broadly, do they include the underlying research data which
the plaintiffs' epidemiologists re-analyzed? As Part I of this Article
demonstrates, the Rule 703 standard differs radically from Daubert's
Rule 702 test. For that reason, classifying questions of the use or qual-
ity of data as falling under Rule 703 rather than 702 can easily deter-
mine the outcome of a case.
The thesis of this Article is that Rule 702 controls these questions;
they are scientific questions that should be subjected to the validation
standard decreed in Daubert. Part I of this Article describes the cur-
rent, sharp split of authority over the treatment of research data sup-
porting scientific opinions. Part II explains the importance of the
split of authority and contrasts the Daubert test with the standards ap-
plied in various jurisdictions under Rule 703. The third and final part
of the Article argues that "facts or data" in Rule 703 should be con-
strued narrowly and that questions related to the quality and quantity
of scientific data must be assigned to Rule 702.
In Daubert, the district court judge premised his decision largely
on Rule 703."9 In their rebuttal brief to the Supreme Court, the plain-
tiffs pleaded with the Court to derive an admissibility standard from
Rule 703 rather than Rule 702.60 The plaintiffs pointed out that in
the past, most lower courts had looked to Rule 703.6" In the face of
the district court opinion and the plaintiffs' entreaty, the Court chose
Rule 702, a "less travelled road" to admissibility standards. This Arti-
cle argues that the Court's choice was sound and that such a choice
should make a difference in the interpretation of Rule 703.
59. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal.
1989).
60. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5-13, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113
S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102).
61. Id.
359
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I. THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE CLASSIFICATION OF
QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE QUALITY AND QuANTrrY OF RESEARCH
DATA SUPPORTING A SCIENTIFIC OPINION
Many courts have read Rule 703 expansively to apply not only to
case-specific data such as whether Joyce Daubert ingested Bendectin
(rather than another drug), but also to research data such as the fac-
tual information about patients collected in the published epidemio-
logical studies of Bendectin.62 For example, in another Bendectin
case, Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.,63 the D.C. Circuit evaluated
the plaintiffs' animal, in vitro, and epidemiological studies under the
aegis of Rule 703.' Numerous courts have treated Rule 703 as supply-
ing the analytic frame of reference for assessing the literature,65 scien-
tific research,66 statistical analyses,67 laboratory tests,6" and other
studies69 supporting the scientist's opinion.
However, a few courts have limited the scope of Rule 703 to case-
specific information. In a 1991 Alaska case involving a state evidence
code patterned on the Federal Rules, the opponent challenged the gen-
eral acceptance and validity of the scientific theory underpinning an
expert opinion.7" The opponent pressed the challenge under Rule
703.71 In rejecting that argument, the court rejoined that although
the challenge had been couched "in terms of Evidence Rule 703 ... ,
62. See Mendes-Silva v. United States, 980 F.2d 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Viterbo v. Dow
Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987); 2 GREGORY JOSEPH & STEPHEN SALTZBURG, EvI-
DENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RuLEs IN THE STATES § 52.3, at 103 (1992 Cum. Supp.).
63. 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
64. Richardson, 857 F.2d at 829.
65. See Bauman v. Centex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115, 1120 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980); State v. Val-
ley, 571 A.2d 579, 582 n.3 (Vt. 1989) (stating that the state equivalent to FED. R. EVID. 703
would supply the foundational requirements for assessing expert testimony based on
literature).
66. See Capps v. Manhart, 458 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Neb. 1990) (assessing research used as
the basis of an expert opinion under the state equivalent of FED. R. EvID. 703).
67. See State v. Rolls, 389 A.2d 824, 829 (Me. 1978) (using the Maine equivalent to FED.
R. EVID. 703); State v. Payne, 402 S.E.2d 582, 594 (N.C. 1991) (holding that statistical analy-
ses were sufficient to form the basis of expert testimony under Rule 703).
68. See In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig. (Bean), 533 F. Supp. 567, 578
(D. Colo. 1980) (holding that a physician could properly base his testimony on tests con-
ducted by a laboratory).
69. See Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1983); Mannino v. Interna-
tional Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 853 (6th Cir. 1981); Hagen v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 697
F. Supp. 334, 337 (N.D. Il. 1988); Prechtel v. Gonse, 396 N.W.2d 837, 839 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that various studies could provide the basis for expert testimony under the
state equivalent to FED. R. EVID. 703).
70. Broderick v. King's Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1991).
71. Id. at 1216.
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the appropriate challenge ... falls under Evidence Rule 702. " 72 The
court indicated that while it could entertain an objection to case-spe-
cific data under Rule 703, objections to the scientific data are cogniza-
ble under Rule 702. 7s
Several federal judges drew the same distinction in one of the
most famous toxic tort cases, Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp. In
Christophersen, the plaintiffs were the survivors of a deceased former
employee of Marathon Manufacturing Company. The decedent's
death was caused by small-cell cancer that originated in his colon and
metastasized to his liver. During his tenure as a Marathon employee,
the decedent had been exposed to nickel and cadmium fumes. 75 The
plaintiffs alleged that this exposure caused the decedent's cancer.76
The defense challenged the admissibility of the scientific evidence
which purported to show that exposure to such fumes can cause small-
cell cancer of the colon. 77 In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge
Clark urged a narrow interpretation of Rule 703.78 His view was that
Rule 703 "does not address [scientific] 'methodology.'" 79 In their dis-
sent in Christophersen, Judges Reavley, King, Johnson, and Weiner
echoed that view.8 °
In summary, while there exists respectable authority that Rule
703 applies only to case-specific information, it would be fair to say
that this authority represents a distinct minority view. The body of
cases applying Rule 703 to evaluate scientific data dwarfs the number
of cases holding that the scope of Rule 703 is limited to case-specific
information. However, as Part II explains, prior to the Daubert deci-
sion, it was relatively unimportant to resolve this split of authority.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (a panel of the Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court; rehearing en banc was granted, 914 F.2d 66), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1280 (1992). For discussions of Christophersen, see generally Richard 0. Faulk, The Unan-
swered Questions of Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 4 VILL. ENVrL. LJ. 21 (1993);
Bruce L. James, Fyed Expert Witnesses: The 5th Circuit Takes Charge of Scientific Testimony, 12
Rxv. LrrM. 171 (1992); BarryJ. Nace & Thomas H. Bleakley, How Much Evidence Is Enough?,
TRIAL, Aug. 1990, at 38; Kimberly M. Skaggs, Comment, Limiting the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony: Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 53 Orno ST. L.J. 1185 (1992).
75. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1108.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1109.
78. Id. at 1117-19 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
79. Id. at 1118.
80. Id. at 1129-32 (Reavley, J., dissenting); see also Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29
F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the trial judge's reliance on Rule 703 to scrutinize the
reasoning and methodology employed by the plaintiffs' experts).
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II. THE SUDDEN IMPORTANCE OF RESOLVING THE
SPLIT OF AUTHORITY
Until the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Daubert,
the dispute over the scope of Rule 703 could perhaps be dismissed as
"much ado about nothing." There was no felt need to define the
scope of Rule 703 because the standards under 703 were roughly con-
gruent with the test for the permissibility of testimony based upon a
scientific theory or technique.8 '
Prior to the Daubert decision, the majority ofjurisdictions applied
the Frye test to determine whether a given theory or technique could
serve as the predicate for scientific testimony.8 2 Frye was not only the
leading common law test; it was also the prevailing view among federal
courts and the states with evidence codes modeled after the Federal
Rules."3 In Frye, the court excluded testimony about the systolic blood
pressure test, a forerunner of the polygraph. 4 The court wrote:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is diffi-
cult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the eviden-
tial force of the principle must be recognized, and while the
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony de-
duced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov-
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.8 5
As the Ninth Circuit observed in its opinion in Daubert, the critical
inquiry for the trial judge under Frye is whether there is a consensus
within the specialty that the theory or technique in question is accu-
rate.86 The trial judge must determine whether the theory or tech-
nique "has gained a certain degree of popularity in relevant scientific
circles."87 If a consensus exists, the theory or technique may serve as a
81. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Science Takes the Stand, THE SCIENCES, Nov./
Dec. 1986, at 22-24 (discussing the pre-Daubert standards for the admissibility of scientific
testimony).
82. See I PAUL C. GIANNELI & EDWARDJ. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5 (2d
ed. 1993) (indicating that a majority of federal and state courts had adopted the general
acceptance test set forth in Frye).
83. Id.
84. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
85. Id.
86. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991).
87. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law and Tactics for the Proponents of Scientific Evi-
dence, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 33, 43 (2d ed. 1981).
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premise in the expert's reasoning leading to an admissible, final
opinion.
Likewise, most jurisdictions have treated the existence of consen-
sus as wholly or largely determinative under Rule 703.88 The language
of that Rule permits an expert to rely on a source or type of informa-
tion for "facts or data" if "experts in the particular field" "reasonably
rel [y]" on that source or type of data. 9 The courts have riveted on
the words, "reasonably rely." Some courts actually equated "reason-
ably" with "customarily."90 These courts require trial judges to defer
to the customary practice of the specialty.91 Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a), the judge makes a factual determination as to
whether there is a consensus among the experts within the disci-
pline.92 If the trial judge finds that the consensus exists, the judge
must permit the expert to rely on the kind of information in question;
the judge may not second-guess the reasonableness of the specialty's
practice.93 In other jurisdictions, while the existence of a custom or
consensus is not dispositive, proof of a consensus triggers a rebuttable
presumption that reliance on that type of information is reasonable.94
In still other jurisdictions, while the courts have not formally an-
nounced that the existence of a consensus is decisive, the courts' opin-
ions concentrate exclusively or largely on the question of whether the
experts "commonly,"9" "customarily,"96 "normally,"97 "ordinarily,"98
88. See Imwinkelried, "Bases" of Expert Testimony, supra note 13, at 6.
89. FED. R. EvID. 703.
90. See In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 276-77 (3d Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (stating that the test for admissibility under Rule
703 is to inquire as to whether it is "typical" for experts in a particular field to rely on the
type of data in question). Then District CourtJudge Edward Becker wrote the lower court
opinion overturned by the 1983 opinion. Judge Becker has since been elevated to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. On August 31, 1994, he handed down the Third
Circuit decision in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994), overruling
the 1983 opinion.
91. See Greenwood Utils. Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Go., 751 F.2d 1484, 1495 (5th
Cir. 1985);Jerome F. Page III, Evidence--State v. Wade-Expert Testimony and the Dual Relia-
bility Test, 58 N.C. L. REv. 1161, 1175 (1980); Note, The United States Courts of Appeals: 1971-
72 Term Criminal Law and Procedure, 61 GEo. L.J. 275, 446 (1972) (stating that the custom-
ary practice of a field establishes an adequate basis for reasonable reliability).
92. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) states in pertinent part: "Preliminary questions concerning
the ... admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court ....
93. JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 62, at 107 (1992 Cum. Supp.).
94. See Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 579 A.2d 1241, 1248 (N.J. 1990) (holding that a
court may overrule the presumption of reliability only under extreme circumstances).
95. Joiner v. State, 825 S.W.2d 701, 707-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 3044 (1993).
96. State v. Henze, 356 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Iowa 1984); Socorro v. Orleans Levee Bd.,
561 So. 2d 739, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 579 So. 2d 931 (La.
1991); State v. Sturmfels Farm Lid. Partnership, 795 S.W.2d 581, 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990);
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"regularly,"99 or "usually"100 consider information from that kind of
source.
Given the congruence of these bodies of law, courts found little
or no need to delimit Rule 703. Whether a court characterized scien-
tific research data as "facts or data" under Rule 703 or as part of the
evaluation of the scientific theory under Frye, the question of the valid-
ity of the evidence was the same. The outcome usually turned on the
proponent's ability to prove the existence of a consensus within the
pertinent scientific community.
However, the Supreme Court shattered this congruence when it
decided Daubert. While the majority opinion mentions general accept-
ance as a factor that the judge should consider in deciding whether
the proffered testimony rests on "scientific knowledge" under Rule
702,101 it depreciates the importance of general acceptance and con-
sensus. 10 2 Under Daubert, a showing of consensus is neither necessary
nor sufficient. After listing general acceptance as a factor, Justice
Blackmun explicitly states that the new test "does not require" proof
of "a particular degree of acceptance."' 0 3 In a footnote, he also indi-
cates that proof of widespread acceptance does not suffice to ensure
the admission of the testimony. 0 4 He points out that while the Frye
test was restricted to novel theories and techniques, the new Rule 702
standard does not "apply specially or exclusively to unconventional ev-
idence."'0 5 In short, even traditionally accepted theories and tech-
niques will have to run the gauntlet of the new validation standard. 10
The new scientific validation standard not only superficially dif-
fers from the traditional "general acceptance" test; the new test is
plainly inappropriate for evaluating some types of information that
indisputably fall within the ambit of Rule 703. The Advisory Commit-
tee Note to Rule 703 states that the Rule authorizes a physician to base
Moore v. Grantham, 580 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 599
S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1980).
97. Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 1981); Brown v.
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 468 N.W.2d 105, 114-15 (Neb. 1991).
98. Rock v. Pickleman, 574 N.E.2d 682, 686 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
99. Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 673 (Miss. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910 (1991).
100. Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1432 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935
(1989); Gaw v. State of Utah ex rel Dep't of Transp., 798 P.2d 1130, 1137 (Utah 1990).
101. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993).
102. Id. at 2794.
103. Id. at 2797 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
104. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n.11.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see also Michael J. Saks, Implications of the Daubert Test for Forensic Identification
Science, 1 SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. Evm. Q. 427 (1994).
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an opinion in part on a statement by the patient.10 7 Thus, a medical
expert in Daubert could consider Mrs. Daubert's statement that the
product she took was Bendectin rather than a competing anti-nausea
drug. It may make sense to inquire whether physicians customarily
consider such patient statements in forming diagnoses and prescrib-
ing treatment, but Mrs. Daubert's statement cannot be scientifically
validated in the manner dictated by the Daubert Court. The Note also
raises the possibility that bystanders' statements may sometimes serve
as a partial basis for an opinion under Rule 703.108 The courts some-
times permit accident reconstruction experts to rely on such state-
ments. 09 Hence, an expert might consider a bystander's statement
that she saw the plaintiff give a hand signal to indicate a left turn. A
trial judge could conceivably conduct an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine whether it is routine practice for accident reconstruction ex-
perts to consider that type of statement, but the nature of the
statement is such that its content defies validation in the Daubert sense.
The upshot is that the Daubert case has forced the issue of the
scope of Rule 703. Prior to Daubert, the courts could gloss over the
question of the classification of scientific data. It was immaterial
whether the data fell under Rule 703 or was governed by Frye, in either
case, the focal point of the inquiry was the existence of a consensus
within the scientific circle." 0 The virtual equality of the standards
tended to moot the question. That is no longer the case. It now
makes a difference whether Rule 703 or Rule 702 controls. Those
Rules prescribe different standards and in a given case, that difference
could be outcome determinative. The courts can no longer avoid the
task of defining Rule 703's expression, "[t]he facts or data in the par-
ticular case." Part III of this Article undertakes that task.
III. THE RESOLUTION OF THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY
Part I of this Article pointed out that before Daubert, only a hand-
ful of courts had drawn a boundary between Rules 702 and 703, re-
stricting Rule 703 to case-specific information. Although this narrow
view of Rule 703 has always been the minority view, it is still the
sounder construction of Rules 702 and 703. The text of Rule 703, its
context, its legislative history, and the judicial gloss in Daubert all point
to this conclusion.
107. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
108. See id.
109. 2 GLANNEmw.T & IMWINELD, supra note 82, at § 27-10(C).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 86-100.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
A. The Text of Rule 703
Rule 703 does not simply refer to "facts or data" in a generic
sense. Rather, that language is followed by the qualifying phrase, "in
the particular case." This qualifying phrase strengthens the case for
the minority view. When a statute incorporates a term with an ordi-
nary usage, the courts presume that the legislature intended that us-
age."' The courts assume that the legislature contemplated the
dictionary meaning of the term.1 2 The dictionary meaning of "partic-
ular" is "relating to a particular person or thing" or "distinctive."
'' 13
To draw on Professor Kenneth Culp Davis's classic definition of
"adjudicative facts," the facts "in the particular case" are those "con-
cerning the immediate parties-who did what, where, when, how, and
with what motive or intent."" 4 Information aboutJason Daubert's in-
juries and Joyce Daubert's medication fall within that category. How-
ever, when an expert witness cites scientific data supporting the
validity of a theory or technique used by the expert, it cannot be said
that the information is "particular" to the case. Consider, for exam-
ple, the testimony about the epidemiological re-analysis in Daubert.
Although the information about Jason Daubert's limb defects and
Mrs. Daubert's ingestion of Bendectin was "particular" to the Daubert
lawsuit, the testimony about the re-analysis was not. Over 2000
Bendectin lawsuits were filed." 5 The re-analysis would be equally rel-
evant and admissible in any of the lawsuits as it was in Daubert. Testi-
mony about the re-analysis could be proffered in any case in which
plaintiff family members alleged that Bendectin had caused a baby
born to that family to suffer congenital limb deformities. The testi-
mony is in no way "distinctive" or peculiar to the Daubert lawsuit. The
111. See United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 114 S. Ct. 1599, 1603-04 (1994); Copeland v.
MBNA America, N.A., 820 F. Supp. 537, 540 (D. Colo. 1993); General Eng'g Corp. v. Vir-
gin Islands Water & Power Auth., 636 F. Supp. 22, 45 (D.V.I. 1985), affd, 805 F.2d 88 (3d
Cir. 1986); Taylor v. Forte Hotels Int'l, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 189, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); In re
David L., 286 Cal. Rptr. 398, 400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal
Court, 776 P.2d 222, 231 (Cal. 1989); People v. Young, 237 Cal. Rptr. 703, 706 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987); Poppers v. Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist., 229 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986).
112. See General Motors Corp. v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 641, 647 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 716 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Lyons v. United States, 794 F.
Supp. 238, 239 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Bahnmiller v. Derwinski, 724 F. Supp. 1208, 1213
(E.D. Va. 1989), aff-d in part, vacated in part, 923 F.2d 1085 (4th Cir. 1991).
113. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEw COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 614 (1972).
114. 2 KENNETH F. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03 (1958), quoted in FED. R.
EVID. 201 (a) advisory committee's note.
115. Peter W. Huber, Science on Tria, CHEMISTRY & INDUSTRY, Aug. 2, 1993, at 604.
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testimony tends to validate a general scientific theory of wide
applicability.
B. The Context of Rule 703-Rules 702 and 705
American courts have long recognized the need to construe stat-
utes in context." 6 The Supreme Court itself has emphasized the im-
portance of contextual statutory construction."1 7 Noscitur a sociis is a
hoary maxim of statutory interpretation.18 A single term can draw
meaning from accompanying words;119 similarly, one part of a statu-
tory framework can shed light on the interpretation of another part of
the same statutory scheme. 2 Consequently, Rule 703 must be read
in light of Rules 702 and 705. All three statutes are not only parts of
the Federal Rules of Evidence but are also, more significantly, all compo-
nents of Article VII governing the admission of expert testimony.
They must be harmonized to ensure the coherence of Article VII.121
Unlike Rule 703, Rule 702 has no language limiting its mission to
regulate information "in the particular case." Like noscitur a sociis, ex-
pressio unius is a well-accepted canon of statutory construction. 122 If
the legislature includes a qualification in one statute but omits the
qualification in another, related statute, the courts assume that the
omission was intentional;121 the courts infer that the legislature in-
116. See Homeland Stores, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 17 F.3d 1269, 1273-75 (10th
Cir. 1994); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 17 F.3d 965, 967 (7th
Cir. 1994); 2255 New York Avenue, Ltd. v. Cisneros, 842 F. Supp. 924, 931 (N.D. Tex.
1994); Rourke v. Troy, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Squaw Valley Ski
Corp. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 902-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
117. See King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 112 S. Ct. 570, 574 (1991) (stating that "the mean-
ing of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context").
118. See Smith v. City of Chester, 842 F. Supp. 147, 151 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (explaining
noscitur a sociis as "the meaning of a certain word is derived from the words accompanying
it").
119. Id.
120. See In re BDT Farms, Inc., 21 F.3d 1019 (10th Cir. 1994); Lambert Steel v. Heller
Fin., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (reasoning that in light of other stat-
utes, the phrase "residential units or other structures" refers to non-residential buildings);
People v. Jimenez, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 281, 283-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
121. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutoty Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 373-74 (1991) (stressing the importance and preference of coherence in
statutory interpretations).
122. See United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir. 1992); Bouker v. Cigna
Corp., 847 F. Supp. 337, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1994); United States v. Local 6A, 832 F. Supp. 674
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Gikas v. Zolin, 863 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1993); WjLLI. N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &
PHILIP P. F iCKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 641 (1988).
123. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1761 (1994); United States v.
Espinoza-Leon, 873 F.2d 743, 746 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989); West Coast
Truck Lines, Inc. v. Arcata Community Recycling Ctr., Inc., 846 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir.),
MARYLAND LAW REvIEW
tended that the qualification would not apply to the latter statute. 12 4
The canon is a product of logic and common sense,1 25 and it has spe-
cial force when the statutory scheme was carefully drafted. 126 The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence were carefully sculpted; they are a product of a
judicial and legislative drafting process which began in 1961 and con-
cluded in 1975.127
The drafter's use of "in the particular case" in Rule 703, but not
in 702 makes sense when one considers the function of expert testi-
mony at trial. In most cases, when a litigant calls a scientist to the
stand, the litigant wants the scientist to give the jury an expert insight
into the significance of the facts in the case.'21 The litigant calls the
scientist as a witness precisely because the scientist can draw infer-
ences beyond the lay jurors' capability. 1 9 The scientist generates
these inferences by applying a general explanatory theory to the spe-
cific facts of the pending case.'5 ° While Rule 703 contains the qualify-
ing phrase, "in the particular case," there is no comparable language
in Rule 702.131 The omission of the qualification in Rule 702, coupled
with its inclusion in Rule 703, implies that Rule 702 governs all aspects
of the general explanatory theory while 703 controls the manner in
which the specific facts of the pending case are factored into the ex-
pert's reasoning.
Rule 705 strengthens the implication that the domain of Rule 703
is confined to the case-specific information. 32 Rule 705 provides:
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 1148 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1992); Schering Corp. v. Sullivan, 782 F. Supp. 645, 649 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated
on other grounds, 995 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Miller v. Carlson, 768 F. Supp. 1331, 1335-
36 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
124. See In reKhalid H., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414, 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); In rejose A., 7 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 44, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
125. Crane, 979 F.2d at 690-91.
126. See Foy v. First Nat'l Bank of Elkhart, 868 F.2d 251, 256 (7th Cir. 1989); Bryant v.
Food Lion, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1484, 1490-91 (D.S.C. 1991).
127. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 23-26 (3d ed. 1991).
128. Id. at 519-20.
129. Id. at 520-26.
130. See United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 n.3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. King v. United States,
446 U.S. 939 (1980); United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 862 (1979); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153
(9th Cir. 1973).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 48.
132. Imwinkelried, "Bases" of Expert Testimony, supra note 13, at 17.
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RULE 705. DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDER-
LYING EXPERT OPINION
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference
and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the un-
derlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise.
The expert may in any event be required to disclose the un-
derlying facts or data on cross-examination. 133
Rule 705 uses the same language as Rule 703, "the . . . facts or
data." When a legislature uses identical language in two statutes, the
courts assume that the legislature intended that the language would
have the same meaning in both statutes.13 1 On that assumption, the
wording of Rule 705 cuts strongly in favor of the conclusion that Rule
703 applies only to case-specific data.
On its face, the text of Rule 705 distinguishes between "the facts
or data" "underlying" an opinion and the "reasons" for the opinion.
The first sentence of Rule 705 requires the direct examiner to elicit
the opinion and the "reasons" for the opinion while allowing the
omission of "the underlying facts or data." Construing "the facts or
data" to include the scientific data as well as the case-specific data
would reduce Rule 705 to an absurdity. Rule 705 explicitly requires
the direct examiner to elicit the "reasons" for the opinion, but con-
struing "the facts or data" expansively renders that requirement mean-
ingless. If "the facts or data" include both the scientific research
underlying the expert's theory or technique and the case-specific in-
formation, there is virtually no information left to which the term
"reasons" can apply. As a practical matter, a broad interpretation of
"the facts or data" obliterates the distinction Rule 705 is obviously at-
tempting to make. Rule 705 makes much more sense if "the... facts
or data" mean only the case-specific information-"who did what,
where, when, how, and with what motive or intent;" 135 a narrow inter-
pretation of "the facts or data" makes the distinction between that in-
formation and the "reasons" for the opinion a meaningful one. As
parts of the same statutory scheme, Rules 703 and 705 must be harmo-
nized. Rather than reconciling the two Rules, a broad interpretation
of the expression "the facts or data" reduces Rule 705 to an absurdity.
133. FED. R. EVID. 705.
134. See Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549, 554 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896
(1987); Doctors Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 1448, 1452 (1lth Cir. 1987).
135. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note; see also text accompanying note
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The courts abhor interpretations which lead to absurd
consequences.1
6
C. The Contemporaneous Legislative History of Rule 703-the Advisory
Committee Note Accompanying Rule 703
While the majority of the Supreme CourtJustices favor a textual-
ist or plain meaning approach to the construction of statutes, includ-
ing the Federal Rules of Evidence, 7 the Court has embraced a moderate
version of textualism and routinely considers extrinsic legislative
materials.'13  In particular, the Court has attached great weight to the
Advisory Committee Notes prepared by the drafters of the Federal
Rules. 139
There is an official Note accompanying Rule 703. Concededly,
the interpretation of the Note is not entirely free from doubt. 4 ° How-
136. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); Gibraltar Fin. Corp. of California v. United States, 825 F.2d 1568, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Union Asphalt, Inc. v. Planet Ins. Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 374 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994); Fremont Union High Sch. Dist. v. Board of Educ., 286 Cal. Rptr. 915, 917 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991); Clavell v. North Coast Business Park, 283 Cal. Rptr. 419, 421 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991); Professional Career Colleges, Magna Inst., Inc. v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. Rptr. 5, 7
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
137. Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning"Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEo. WAsH. L. Rev. 857,
864-68 (1992); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed
Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REv. 745 (1990); Glen Weissenberger, Are the Federal Rules of
Evidence a Statute?, 55 OHIO ST. LJ. 393, 393-97 (1994); Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme
Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1324-32
(1992).
138. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the Supreme Court's Approach to the Interpreta-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. REv. 267, 269-71 (1993).
139. See, e.g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988) (relying heavily on the
Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EvID. 803(8)); see also Williamson v. United States, 114
S. Ct. 2431, 2442 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (relying in part on the Advisory Com-
mittee Note to FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3)).
140. The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 703 includes the follow-
ing passage: "The rule also offers a more satisfactory basis for ruling upon the admissibility
of public opinion poll evidence. Attention is directed to the validity of the techniques
employed rather than to relatively fruitless inquiries whether hearsay is involved." Merrell
Dow seized on this passage in its brief to argue that Rule 703 governs the question of "the
validity of the [scientific] techniques employed" by the expert witness. Brief for Respon-
dent at 33-34, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No.
92-102). However, the passage in question is perfectly consistent with the interpretation of
Rule 703 urged in this article. Suppose that in a trademark infringement case, the plaintiff
conducts a public opinion poll to demonstrate that the members of the public confuse the
plaintiff's mark with a mark recently adopted by the defendant. Or assume that to support
a motion for a change of venue, the accused conducts a poll to demonstrate that most local
citizens have already formed the opinion that the accused is guilty. Unlike the opinion
that Bendectin can cause birth defects, these opinions are "particular" to the pending
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ever, in several respects, the Note supports a narrow interpretation of
"[t] he facts or data" in Rule 703. To give the reader a sense of the
intended scope of Rule 703, in the Advisory Committee Note the
drafters provided several examples of proper bases for opinions. The
first paragraph of the Note refers to "statements by patients and rela-
tives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doc-
tors, hospital records, and X-rays. " "' The paragraph makes no
mention of scientific texts or studies. All of these examples are illus-
trations of case-specific data-a patient's statement that he exper-
ienced pain, a report by a relative that the patient complained about
pain, a nurse's opinion that the patient was in pain, a hospital record
quoting the patient's complaint about pain, or an X-ray showing the
possible cause of the pain. The third paragraph of the Note indicates
that in some cases, an expert might be able to base an opinion on a
statement by a bystander if the statement is "of a type reasonably re-
lied upon by experts in [the] particular field." 2 A bystander's state-
ment about a traffic accident would necessarily be information
peculiar to the case. By no stretch of the imagination could a by-
stander's statement be characterized as part of the scientific data.
In addition to providing illustrations of the intended scope of
Rule 703, the Advisory Committee Note explains the purpose of enact-
ing Rule 703. The initial paragraph of the Note makes it abundantly
clear that a major purpose of adopting Rule 703 was to create an alter-
native to using the hypothetical question.143 Consider two possible
hypothetical questions in the Daubert case. On direct examination of
one of their epidemiological experts, the plaintiffs' attorney might
ask:
Professor, I want you to assume the following facts. (1) Mrs.
Daubert regularly ingested an anti-nausea drug during her
cases. The researcher will testify that her poll shows that most consumers confuse the
defendant's mark with this specific plaintiffs logo or that most potential jurors believe that
this specific accused is guilty of the pending charge. The Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 703 does not say that Rule 703 governs the question of the validity of the expert's
polling methodology. Rather, the Note says only that attention can be directed to that
question because Rule 703 eliminates the hearsay objection to the respondents' statements
to the pollster. Rule 703 has the effect of clearing the way for the courts to focus on the
question of the validity of scientific polling methodology used by eliminating the hearsay
objection that had previously led several courts to exclude poll evidence. Under Daubert
though, Rule 702 should govern the question of what constitutes sound polling
methodology.
141. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
142. Id.
143. Id. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals made this point in its brief. Brief for Respondent
at 18, Daubert (No. 92-102).
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first trimester. (2) That drug was Bendectin. (3) Jason
Daubert was born as a result of that pregnancy. And (4) at
the time of birth, Jason's limbs were deformed. Based on
those facts, do you have an opinion as to the cause ofJason's
limb defects?
That phrasing is clearly proper. All the facts enumerated in the hy-
pothesis are case-specific information, and the form of the question
would be unobjectionable. Alternatively, if the witness were a treating
doctor with personal knowledge of these facts-he had prescribed the
Bendectin for Mrs. Daubert and had delivered Jason-Rule 703 would
be satisfied. As the first paragraph of the Note indicates, the expert
could rely on hearsay reports from the patient, relatives, and other
doctors as the basis for assuming these facts. Under Rule 703, person-
ally known facts, reliable hearsay reports, and hypothetically assumed
facts all are permissible bases for expert opinion testimony.
However, vary the wording of the hypothesis and there is a differ-
ent result. Assume now that the plaintiffs' attorney phrased the ques-
tion in this manner:
Professor, I want you to assume the following facts. (1) Mrs.
Daubert regularly ingested an anti-nausea drug during her
first trimester. (2) That drug was Bendectin. (3) Jason
Daubert was born as a result of that pregnancy. (4) At the
time of birth,Jason's limbs were deformed. And (5) epidemio-
logic studies show that there is a statistically significant relationship
between maternal use of Bendectin and birth defects. Based on
those facts, do you have an opinion as to the cause ofJason's
limb defects?
Common sense dictates that this phrasing is improper. The expert's
scientific knowledge is what he or she contributes to the factfinding
process. This attorney's hypothesis specifies "[t] he facts or data in the
particular case," and the "scientific knowledge" that the expert should
apply to evaluate the significance of the facts. It is wrong-minded for
the attorney's hypothesis to tell the expert what scientific data to as-
sume. Selecting the scientific data is the province of the expert, and
this phrasing of the hypothesis reverses the roles of the expert witness
and questioning attorney.
Rule 703 merely identifies three methods of presenting the same
type of information to the expert. If, in using one method, it would
be improper for the questioner to specify the scientific propositions
the expert may rely on, it would be improper to do so in using any
method. Rule 703 was never intended as the mechanism for supply-
ing and regulating the scientific data underlying the expert's opinion;
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its limited function is regulation of the input of the case-specific infor-
mation that the expert is asked to evaluate.
D. The Subsequent Gloss on Article VI-The Daubert Decision
We now have the benefit of the Supreme Court's pronounce-
ments on Article VII in the Daubert case. 1" As previously noted, after
describing the new validation test, Justice Blackmun commented that
"[t]he focus . . .must be solely on principles and methodology."1 45
There is agreement that, at the very least, this focus includes the ques-
tion of the general validity of the "methodology" of unpublished epi-
demiological re-analysis. The validity of that methodology may be the
starting point of the plaintiffs' experts' reasoning, but the scientific
reasoning does not end there. The plaintiffs' experts proposed to ap-
ply that methodology to the previously reported epidemiological re-
search data on Bendectin.146 The point of disagreement is whether
"l[t] he focus" of the Daubert validation standard applies not only to the
general validity of epidemiological re-analysis but also to the balance
of the expert's scientific reasoning. In order to reach the final conclu-
sion that maternal use of Bendectin can cause limb defects, the ex-
perts must rely on intermediate conclusions as to the quality of the
research data collected, the adequacy of the quantity of research data,
and the strength of the inference of statistical significance. Does the
Daubert Rule 702 standard apply to those questions, or are they "data"
subsumed under Rule 703?
If Rule 702 governs the validity of the starting point, by parity of
reasoning it must also govern the validity of the intermediate reason-
ing steps. Like the starting point, those steps are necessary, technical
components of the witness's chain of scientific reasoning.
As a matter of scientific logic, the truth of the intermediate rea-
soning steps is just as essential to the validity of the final conclusion
that the ingestion of Bendectin during the first trimester can cause
limb defects at birth, as the truth of the starting assumption about
epidemiological re-analysis. 14 7 If any of the links in that chain of rea-
soning is flawed, the final conclusion is invalid.
Furthermore, the nature of the intermediate questions is indistin-
guishable from the nature of the initial question about the validity of
epidemiological re-analysis. None of these questions falls within the
144. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
145. Id. at 2797.
146. Id.
147. Imwinkelried, supra note 14, at 496-99.
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normal ken of laypersons; these questions differ qualitatively from the
concerns about case-specific information that undeniably falls under
Rule 703. The answer to each question requires technical expertise.
Daubert certainly requires the plaintiffs to establish the scientific valid-
ity of epidemiological re-analysis.1 48 However, there are also scientific
standards governing the collection of research data, 49 the requisite
size of the database to support particular inferences,1 50 and the
proper statistical methods for inferring correlation. 5 ' The character
of the question of the validity of re-analysis is the same as the charac-
ter of the intermediate reasoning steps. If Daubert supplies the stan-
dard for answering the former question, its validation standard ought
to be equally applicable to the latter issues.
CONCLUSION
In Daubert, the Supreme Court chose the "less travelled" road.
Prior to Daubert, most lower courts had either applied the common
law Frye standard to gauge the admissibility of scientific evidence, or
they had endeavored to derive admissibility standards from Rule 703.
In their reply brief, the plaintiffs urged the Supreme Court to follow
the well travelled road.'52 However, the Daubert Court ultimately de-
cided to derive validation standards from the expression, "scientific
knowledge," in Rule 702. That decision should make "all the differ-
ence" in terms of statutory construction and evidentiary policy.
As a matter of statutory construction, the Daubert Court opted to
rest its decision on at least the general validity of epidemiological anal-
ysis under Rule 702.113 In turn, that decision hopefully will persuade
the lower courts to assign the other relevant decisions-the quality
and quantity of the epidemiological research data and the permissibil-
ity of the inference of statistical significance-to Rule 702. Once that
assignment has been made, Article VII will form a coherent whole.
Rule 702 will govern the issues of whether the witness qualifies as a
scientific expert and whether all the essential steps in the witness's
scientific reasoning process have been validated; Rule 703 will control
only the question of whether there is a proper source for the case-
specific data to which the witness applies her general theory. Rule 704
will regulate the phrasing of the final opinion. A narrow interpreta-
148. Id. at 500.
149. 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 82, § 15-4.
150. Id. at § 15-4(B).
151. Id. at § 15-6(A).
152. Brief for Petitioner at 30-33, Daubert (No. 92-102).
153. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794-99 (1993).
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tion of "facts or data" in Rule 703 will enable the courts to piece to-
gether a rational conception of Article VII.
In contrast, an expansive interpretation of that phrase in Rule
703 makes a shambles of the structure of Article VII. If "facts or data"
includes scientific data, it will be well nigh impossible to draw an intel-
ligent boundary between Rules 702 and 703. While Rule 702 would
control the question of the validity of the expert's starting point
(namely, the reliability of epidemiological re-analysis), all the related
questions such as the quality and quantity of the research database
would fall under Rule 703. All of these questions lend themselves to
the scientific validation standard announced in Daubert. Affirmative
answers to all of these questions are equally essential to ensure that an
expert's final conclusion deserves the appellation "scientific knowl-
edge." Yet some would arbitrarily allocate these questions to Rule
703. Moreover, a broad construction of Rule 703 wreaks havoc with
the interpretation of Rule 705. A broad interpretation of "the facts or
data" in Rule 705 would drain almost all of the meaning from the
term "reasons" in that Rule. The expression must be narrowly con-
strued in Rule 705, and there is no evident reason to construe the
expression otherwise in Rule 703.
Assigning these questions to Rule 702 is just as vital to guarantee
that expert testimony law rests on sound evidentiary policy. In
Daubert, the Court abandoned the traditional "general acceptance"
test.15 4 Fye was "a crude, unscientific criterion for gauging scientific
testimony; it amounts to assessing validity by counting heads. To
prove a hypothesis a researcher must do more than poll colleagues or
ask for a show of hands at a scientific convention."155 The Daubert
decision represents an advance precisely because it mandates that trial
judges refocus their attention on "direct measures of scientific valid-
ity" such as "the extent and quality of the experimental verification of
the theory or technique being offered." 56 Like the validity of epide-
miological re-analysis, the questions concerning the research data
about Bendectin are "direct" determinants of the scientific merit of
the plaintiffs' contention that Bendectin can cause limb deformities.
A narrow interpretation of Rule 703 will prompt trial judges to analyze
those questions under Rule 702.
In Daubert, the Court chose the right road by opting to derive
validation standards from Rule 702. However, that choice will not
154. Id. at 2793.
155. EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, Abolish the Frye Test: Relevancy is a Better Standard for Admis-
sibility of Scientific Evidence, 12 CAL. LAWYER 63 (Apr. 1992).
156. Id.
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have its full beneficial impact-it will not make "all the difference"-
unless Rule 703 is limited and all the essential components of the sci-
entist's major premise are tested by Daubert's validation standard. 157
Under a broad interpretation of Rule 703, courts might continue to
subject those components of the scientific reasoning process to Frye's
popularity test. If consensus and popularity are not the criterion for
passing on the general validity of epidemiological re-analysis, they
surely should not be the litmus test for these other components. A
narrow reading of Rule 703 is a legal and scientific imperative.
157. Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F. Supp. 1481, 1496 n.14 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (citing Daubert,
the court states that "[the entire [scientific] reasoning process must be valid").
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